Producing exhausting answers to all questions, critiques, comments and further arguments raised in the discussion of the book would require the writing of a new book altogether. I set myself the more limited task of using some of those questions and comments as signposts for clarifying a number of central propositions contained in my chapter of the book.
- Adam Smith on the commercial society
- Benedetto Croce on the place of morality in economics
- ‘Don’t do to others what you don’t want that others do to you’. Is this the meaning of secular morality?
- ‘Should the seller of used cars tell customers the truth?’. What do we mean by profit in the commercial society?
- The immorality of millionaire bonuses in the wake of the current banking and financial crisis
- Jürgen Habermas on embryo manipulation and abortion
1. Adam Smith on the commercial society
‘…«This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful, and to despise, or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and mean conditions…is…the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments». Those are not my words. They were written by Adam Smith, who regarded the likelihood that we would come to admire wealth and despise poverty, admire success and scorn failure, as the greatest risk facing us in the commercial society whose advent he predicted. It is now upon us…’ (quoted from Tony Judt, ‘What Is Living and What Is Dead in Social Democracy?’, The New York Review of Books, December 17, 2009)
‘…[Amartya Sen’s] hero is Adam Smith: not the Smith of free market legend, but the father of political economy who grasped the force of moral constraint and the value of sociability. To encapsulate the shift in attitude that Mr Sen has sought to bring about, ethics and economics are to be seen as Smith saw them: not two subjects, but one…’ (quoted from The Economist, August 8th 2009, review of Amartya Sen’s book The Idea of Justice)
In the first part of my chapter I’ve tried to provide a philosophically rigorous demonstration that economics and ethics are distinct and must not be confused, because they are concerned with different stages – or aspects – of human conscious behaviour: the pursuit of the useful (economics) and the pursuit of the good (ethics). From a strict philosophical point of view I’m therefore in disagreement with Judt, Sen, and Smith. However I use these quotations to add authority to one of my further claims, that though economics and ethics are conceptually distinct, they are also inextricably intertwined at the level of both individual behaviour and social developments. At the individual level, possessing morality means possessing the capacity to distinguish between the useful and the good, and to realize that the good lies above the useful. The useful is not a standard of morality. The individual’s pursuit of the useful must be logically and practically consistent with his standard of morality, that is, his concept of the good. If it is not, then it becomes immoral (or non-moral, which is the same). At the social level, the absence of a standard of morality governing the individual pursuit of the useful is ‘the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments’, and ‘the greatest risk facing us in the commercial society’ (to use, with a harmless touch of tautology, Smith’s words as reported above by Judt). In later sections of my chapter I continue along a logical path that further reinforces and specifies Smith’s judgement, and leads to one of my central claims: the special public role of the unique secular morality of individual freedom-independence in opposition not only to the non-morality of the useful, but also to all sorts of non-secular (religious or ideological) moralities.
2. Benedetto Croce on the place of morality in economics
‘…The ethicization of politics and economics by the Church is in the order of things of a theocratic system…But in the world of business it is a contradiction in terms. The marginalist revolution…with the concept of utility has…theorized the role of choice and interest in the economy, distinguishing the «practical» will, coinciding with the individual end, from the «moral» will, which transcends into a universal end. «The economic fact – writes Croce – is the practical activity of man, considered in itself, independently from any moral or immoral determination»…’ (quoted from Piero Ostellino, ‘Il senso di colpa del capitalismo’, Corriere della Sera, 8.2.2010)
This quotation from Croce is formally correct, but to those who don’t know his thinking in depth – because of plain ignorance, or philosophical prejudice, or intrinsic lack of understanding capacity – it conveys a perception of his position which is, at best, misleading and reductive. Though the secular State, the liberal social order, and the role of ethics in the economy are currently much debated – they are after all at the heart of the European socio-cultural model in the globalized world – Croce is not exactly today on the bestseller list. And yet he should be. Two other quotations from Croce offer a deeper insight into his views on the subject. One is the text on freedom and morality quoted in my chapter (p. 39), to which I refer the audience. The other is a quotation from his opposition speech (the only one) on May 23rd 1929 in the Senate debate on the ratification of the Accordi Lateranensi regulating the relationship of the Roman Catholic Church and the Vatican with the Italian State, signed two months earlier by Mussolini and the Vatican Secretary of State (the quotation is in the classic work Chiesa e Stato in Italia negli ultimi cento anni, by Arturo Carlo Jemolo, 3rd revised edition, Torino, Einaudi 1971, p. 496). In his Senate speech Croce recalls the famous saying attributed to King Henry the IV of France: ‘…nearby or in front of the people who believe that Paris is well worth a mass, there are others for whom to attend or not attend a mass is worth infinitely more than Paris, because it is a matter of conscience. Woe to society, to human history, if men possessed by such different sentiment, had failed them in the past or should fail them now!’. I know of no stronger statement than this on (i) the primacy of morality over economics at the level of individual conscience and behaviour, with its necessary subjection-consistency of the ‘practical’ volition of interests (the useful) to the ‘moral’ volition of universal values (the good), and (ii) the fateful risks facing a commercial society (in fact any society) where this indispensable subjection-consistency is removed from individual conscience.
Croce was a great twentieth century master of secular ethics, and of the distinction-relationship between economics and ethics. But in the context of the critical rationalist world-view one important caveat is in order. It must be remembered (as I do in my chapter, p. 39) that Croce was an idealistic philosopher. Strictly his freedom-morality is the freedom-morality not of the ‘physical’ individual, but of the universal mind. In idealistic philosophy it is the mind (the spirit) that is real, not the physical world, because, in his own much criticized words, ‘physical facts have no reality’. If his insight of the identity between consciousness, freedom and morality is to survive in the world-view of critical rationalism, then we must translate it in the terms of the personal identity, consisting in the personal experience of consciousness and self-consciousness as a fact of the ‘physical’ world. His freedom-morality of the mind must be converted into the freedom-morality of the ‘physical’ individual, and his statement that ‘…since freedom coincides in every respect with morality and contains in itself every moral obligation, there is no task of such nature lying outside its reach…’ must be unambiguously related to the individual consciousness as the only ‘physical’ source of morality.
3. ‘Don’t do to others what you don’t want that others do to you’. Is this the meaning of secular morality?
It has been suggested in the discussion that the secular morality upheld by some people in opposition-alternative to the morality of religion is nothing else than the above quoted principle. In general, though not always, those who reduce secular morality to this principle hold also, implicitly, the value judgement that it is a purely practical principle, with no higher meaning than that of pretending to ensure a viable and peaceful social coexistence. As such it is morally inferior to the spiritual morality of religion – specifically of the Christian religion. I’ve demonstrated in my chapter of the book that this view of secular morality is flawed, and shall here strengthen my case by concentrating on three points.
First. The principle ‘don’t do to others…’ may be interpreted in two ways, a ‘low’ one and a ‘high’ one. According to the ‘low’ interpretation, it is a behavioural code founded on its practical usefulness. If I respect the others, then I can also pretend – or at least expect – that they will do the same to me. If I don’t respect them, then I cannot pretend – nor expect – them to respect me. The rationale of this ‘moral’ behavioural code is entirely utilitarian: the reason why I should respect the others is the expected personal benefit of being respected by them. If we all accept this behavioural code, then there is a good chance that each one of us may be able to go about his own business while coexisting with all others in a viable and peaceful social environment. If we don’t accept it, then we have the law of the jungle, and everyone’s life becomes difficult and dangerous. The principle is a utilitarian behavioural code, and as such it has nothing to do with morality. My whole chapter is based on the philosophical premise that morality and usefulness are a contradiction in terms: morality (goodness) begins when usefulness (utility, economics) ceases and vice versa. If this fundamental proposition is not accepted then I don’t see the point of talking about morality in the first place. If there are no values there are only interests, and if there are only interests there is only the economics of the useful. The very concept of morality is meaningless, and it only obscures our understanding of human society. Full stop.
But the principle may be given a ‘high’ interpretation. It is a behavioural code founded on a general, prejudicial recognition of principle, namely that the interests of each member of the human family have – precisely as a matter of principle – the same value in society as those of all others. According to this interpretation I must respect the others not in order to pretend the same from them in return, but simply because I recognize that their interests have – objectively – the same social value as my own. Why one does recognize this is not important. It may be sentiment, instinct, natural generosity towards one’s fellow men, the attempt to look at our existence from a higher perspective than that centred on oneself, anything. He takes this recognition as a matter of fact. It is clear that this interpretation rises by one degree above the previous one. It tries to rise above the domain of the useful. In my essay I call this the principle of social solidarity, but my whole chapter is an attempt to demonstrate that rising above the useful and leaving it behind is not enough to enter into the domain of morality.
Second. There can be no true morality if there is no faith in something, no belief in something that gives an absolute meaning to human life (as opposed to a conditional-contingent one), and thereby represents the absolute good (as opposed to the useful). It is perfectly possible for a person to possess a deeply felt altruistic behavioural code even without believing in some concept of absolute goodness, but (I quote here from my chapter) ‘reducing morality to a person’s altruistic sentiments and behavioural code is a mistake stemming from a deficient understanding of morality’s place in spiritual life’. A morality not supported by a concept of absolute goodness has two fatal weaknesses. First, it is no match for the moralities of religion and ideology, in the sense that in competing with them for the heart of men it will always be on the losing side. Second, it is also no match against (I quote again from my chapter) ‘the secular non-morality of the drive for personal well-being, social success and power, pursued with all means as the primary reason of life’, and no effective obstacle against the incentive for rent-exploitation to become the dominant one in society.
Third. My chapter of the book is an attempt to demonstrate that the secular morality of individual freedom-independence, based on the critical-rationalist world-view, has the full status of a true morality, because it does contain a concept of absolute goodness. Indeed, my claim is stronger than this. It is that such secular morality is ideally and practically superior to any morality based on religion or ideology (by religion I mean Christianity, Judaism and Islam, because I lack the knowledge for considering the relation between western secularism and other religions, particularly the oriental ones). Ideally, because it is based on the acceptance of reality as it is, not on building one that satisfies our wishes. Secular morality is intrinsically linked to a concept of full individual independence-responsibility, a concept that is in turn intrinsically incompatible with any view of a designer-master, and of a relationship of authority, obedience, reward, punishment, atonement, resting on the moral subordination of somebody to somebody else. Practically, because all religious and ideological moralities are based on a fundamental denial of the supreme principle of individual freedom-independence. Although I take exclusive responsibility for my assertions and reasoning on this point, I want to repeat here that they owe much to the ideas of such philosophers and scientists as Hans Albert, Benedetto Croce, Jürgen Habermas, Karl Popper, Steven Weinberg and Edward O.Wilson. In certain respects the positions of these people are actually deeply divergent. For instance, most students of philosophy would object to the possibility of a constructive relationship between Popper and Croce, or between Albert and Habermas (James Buchanan, drawing on his personal acquaintance with Albert, defined the latter’s intellectual relationship to Habermas in the simplest of ways: ‘he hates him!’). However I claim the merit – or the blame – of having shown that on certain central issues of moral philosophy their views converge in offering strong rational support to the primacy of the unique secular ethics of individual freedom-independence which I’ve placed at the centre of my chapter.
4.‘Should the seller of used cars tell customers the truth?’. What do we mean by profit in commercial societies?
These questions, raised in the discussion, are unambiguously answered in my chapter, from which I quote: ‘Possessing social solidarity…has radical implications in terms of a person’s social responsibility and behaviour. First, an uncompromising commitment to personal honesty in one’s social life (absolute personal honesty is indeed the first and foremost expression of social generosity, but not surprisingly this is widely overlooked in non-secular cultures, which tend to identify generosity and altruism with ‘giving’ to others and ‘direct dedication’ to their needs). Second, a sense of the state, meaning the capacity of a person to perceive and value his public interests…shared in his political capacity with the other members of a political community, no less than his private interests’. The differences between the (unique) secular morality and the non-secular ones, in particular the religious ones, are many, and they run deep. One of them is especially relevant in the present context.
Under secular morality the greatest social virtue, that is, the foremost expression of social solidarity, is a commitment to absolute personal honesty in social relations. Non-secular cultures and moralities place no special emphasis on this commitment. In particular, under religious cultures and moralities the foremost expression of social solidarity is not absolute personal honesty in social relation, but the charity of giving, the identification of social altruism with one’s dedication to the needs of the others, and the individual pursuit of the so-called ‘common good’ (a concept which under the perspective of the secular world-view is at best meaningless, and at worst quite dangerous). The secular civic morality of personal honesty has unconditional implications in relation to the liberal commercial society. The seller of used cars must tell customers the truth. More generally, no profit, no economic benefit, can ever be pursued through market transactions based on the deception of other people, because such deception would be intrinsically incompatible with the social imperatives descending from secular morality. These are tall requirements, whose implementation in the commercial society may entail enormous personal and business costs, especially in the form of the renunciation to profits and benefits that could otherwise be secured. I quote from a report in the International Herald Tribune, February 18th 2008, on the German tax scandal of the time, involving the former highly successful and respected chief of Deutsche Post, Klaus Zumwinkel: ‘…Zumwinkel, who studied economics at Wharton Business School in Philadelphia in the 1970s, had set out his own ideas about a market economy in comments he made several years ago. «You cannot organize a market economy according to purely moral principles, it will go bankrupt», he said…«The international market knows no morality»…’. But – I claim – for those who grasp the full strength of the secular moral belief that ‘a mass is worth infinitely more than Paris’ there is no room for compromise.
The mind boggles at the thought of what would be the impact on the commercial society if the secular civic morality of absolute personal honesty were rooted, with its full ethical strength, in the individual conscience of man, and shared by a sufficiently large number of people. It is an easy guess that most of the evils, inequities and wastes of the commercial society would vanish. As a matter of fact, such secular morality is weak and shared by few. But this, far from relegating this reasoning into the fictional realm of a book of dreams, makes it all the more relevant in practice. Following Smith and Croce (and also Sen, but to a lesser extent) it must be recognized that morality and economics are inextricably entangled inside the human individual conscience, and that the moral sentiments (or the lack of them) inhabiting it are likely to affect the liberal commercial society more than any other single physical and social factor.
The difference between the secular civic morality of absolute personal honesty, and the religious morality of charity-giving and the individual pursuit of the so-called common good, is quite radical. It has been expressed in today’s discussion in a most effective way, which I want to recall. The former rests on an ex-ante approach to the systemic failures of an otherwise accepted liberal commercial society. The latter aims at repairing those failures ex post, under the untenable position of accepting the liberal commercial society in practice, while rejecting it in principle.
5. The immorality of millionaire bonuses in the wake of the current banking and financial crisis
In the discussion, criticism has been raised against my radical distinction between moral and social justice, and my claim that issues of equity-equality in the interpersonal distribution of wealth are not as such issues of morality. It has been objected that the recent disproportionate compensations received by inept and/or greedy bankers and financial managers responsible for the bankruptcy of their own businesses, or of that of others, and of the ensuing misery of many people, should be, and are in fact widely, judged as immoral. I do not say that this judgement is wrong, but I suspect that it may be given a wrong meaning. Consider the logic underlying my claim that issues of commutative and distributive justice can have as such no moral content because they concern the distribution of well-being among people, that is, the ‘relative’ satisfaction of their interests, while issues of morality do not concern the satisfaction of interests, but the pursuit and protection of the absolute goodness in human life. I owe my understanding-appreciation of this fundamental point to Croce, but I found further support for it in Avishai Margalit. The proposition that the concept of justice does not possess a moral meaning of its own, because in so far as it does possess one this must be already contained in the (unique) moral concept of freedom, while in so far as it possesses a meaning not already contained in the moral concept of freedom then this cannot, for this very reason, be a moral one, this proposition – I say – has been beautifully argued in a classic article by Croce, quoted in my chapter (‘Revisione filosofica dei concetti di «libertà» e «giustizia»’, in La Critica, 1943, fascicolo V, pp. 276-84, reprinted in B.Croce-L.Einaudi, Liberismo e liberalismo, 2nd edition 1988, Milan-Naples, Riccardo Ricciardi Editore, pp. 85-97). Those who’ve personally known Sergio Steve may care to know that this remarkable article was pointed out to me by him, and I still remember the few dry words with which he rendered it to me.
One may subscribe to this proposition, but still consider it a fine philosophical point of little practical relevance. If so, he would be wrong. My claim in this context draws on Margalit and his ‘decent society’ (his choice of ‘decent’ to mean ‘morally just’ could not have been more unfortunate!). If we want to evaluate some objective social state or condition as morally unjust, then the test is whether it causes individuals to be – and feel – humiliated, that is, injured in their sentiment of self-respect (which I equate to the sentiment of their moral freedom-independence). Clearly, one such objective social condition would be there when people were forced to become beggars, or children to work day and night, in order to survive, or when someone’s identity were existentially determined by someone else (as in the case of embryo manipulation). But when there is no such objective social condition of individual humiliation, then the judgment of immorality can only be applied to the individual behaviour of individual people, not to establishing objective standards for deciding whether certain facts of wealth distribution are moral or immoral. If we did so we would place ourselves, perhaps unwillingly, onto the ideological course of giving to facts of the social world (in this case, wealth distribution) a moral status in their own right which they cannot possess, a path with potentially far-reaching political consequences. Would we be able to decide some range under which the compensations of unprofessional and/or irresponsible managers would be moral, and above which they would be immoral? We would not. Can we say that such compensations are, in themselves, the cause of someone’s humiliation? We can’t. The payment of disproportionate compensations to such people is a case of economic inequity, or, in a more general language, of (social) distributive injustice, not one of moral injustice. If we want to bring it under the category of morality, then we must leave the domain of objective social conditions of moral injustice, and move into that of the moral consistency of personal behaviour. In another part of this comment I’ve emphasized the secular civic moral imperative of absolute personal honesty. There is no doubt that the personal choices and actions of these reckless people, by which they caused the bankruptcy of their own business and/or of those of others, and then further managed to secure those compensations for themselves, and which were aimed not at creating wealth but at subtracting as much wealth as possible from others through their deception, have been not only unprofessional, but also as morally incompatible with that secular imperative as any immoral behaviour could ever be.
6. Jürgen Habermas on embryo manipulation and abortion
At the end of my chapter I report on a recent intervention by Habermas, in which he raises fundamental moral objections against a liberal regulation of the manipulation of the embryos’ genetic endowment for therapeutic purposes (positive eugenics). It has been observed in the discussion that if one subscribes to Habermas’ rejection of a therapeutic manipulation of embryos, he should even more strongly reject any type of abortion. I want to make clear that this proposition fully misses the point. Habermas rejects a liberal regulation of positive eugenics because he fears that it could eventually lead to an existentially imbalanced relationship between two otherwise comparable human beings: the manipulator of the embryo would act as a genetic designer, and the human being into which the embryo would subsequently develop would come to regard himself as genetically designed by the former. Cultural transmissions and educational processes unfold within a demand and supply medium, while genetic programmes do not allow the future human beings to participate in the exchange. The rejection of a liberal regulation of abortion is instead based on the non-secular dogma that an embryo has from the very first stage of his existence the same moral status as a fully developed human being. My claim is simple and clear. Rejecting a liberal regulation of positive eugenics on Habermas’ moral grounds is fully consistent with the secular world-view and morality (even though one may not want to carry the rejection as far as Habermas does). On the other hand, rejecting a liberal regulation of abortion on moral grounds may well be consistent with certain religious world-views, but it certainly is not consistent with the secular world-view and morality, nor is it implied by Habermas’ argument against positive eugenics.